Current Projects

Kantian Justice and Civic Respect – Book Manuscript in progress.

Here I argue that a rich conception of civic respect is central to understanding Kant’s discussions of justice and citizenship and for developing Kantian (or Kant-based) accounts of justice for domestic, international and cosmopolitan contexts. Two opening chapters examine Kant’s conception of civic respect, its bearing on his accounts of justice, lawmaking and institution-building and the connection this conception reveals between Kant’s moral and political theories (especially between his account of justice and the Groundwork formulas of autonomy and the kingdom of ends). Later chapters trace the implications of this integrated picture for civic relations both within a just Kantian state and across national boundaries. These address what it means to respect fellow citizens in the realms of property ownership, criminal punishment and protest/resistance to injustice, explore what civic respect requires of those who assume social or institutional roles (e.g., of legal judge, domestic employer or neighbor), consider the implications of civic respect for our responsibilities and attitudes regarding both integration and immigration, and explore the part that civic virtues should play in a Kant-based account of justice. These chapters thus challenge the claim that Kant’s moral and political theories are sharply separate and the currently popular view that we best understand what justice requires on Kant’s account by adopting the perspective of a citizen contemplating the rights she can assert by virtue of her humanity. They also contend that Kantian theory, well-interpreted and judiciously expanded, offers valuable insight as we seek to address contemporary questions of justice on the ground. This is true notwithstanding the fact that some of the questions at issue are ones Kant himself could not have anticipated and that some of the answers on offer are ones he might well have refused to endorse.

“Legislating in the Fray: Lillian Hellman and the Kingdom of Ends” in preparation for Human Dignity and the Kingdom of Ends: Kantian Perspectives and Practical Applications, ed. Adam Cureton and Jan-Willem van der Rijt, Routledge.

Immanuel Kant famously urges that, in making day-to-day moral decisions, we should take up the perspective of legislators for a so-called kingdom of ends. But the perspective of the kingdom of ends arguably rejects, as morally inadequate, some of the very human traits and propensities most likely to strengthen our moral judgment and resolve in difficult real-world conditions. With some help from Lillian Hellman (playwright, McCarthy era critic, social-norm-challenger and innovative memoirist), I consider this potential failing. My analysis explores the connections among Kant’s legislative ideal, the Kantian conception of dignity and the aim of enlightenment. It emphasizes the importance of moral aspiration for a sound reading of Kant’s work and a wise approach to our moral circumstances.